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10.1007/s12304-017-9299-2 http://scihub22266oqcxt.onion/10.1007/s12304-017-9299-2 C5585286!5585286!28943975     free     free     free Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 211.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534       Biosemiotics 2017 ; 10 (2): 195-210 Nephropedia Template TP {{tp|p=28943975|t=2017. Mental Misrepresentation in Non-human Psychopathology |pdf=|usr=}}{{28943975}} gab.com Text Mental Misrepresentation in Non-human Psychopathology JO: Biosemiotics http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=28943975 #FOAvip In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopathology. Mentally-ill non-human minds, in particular in delusions, obsessive-compulsive disorders and similar cognitive states, are traditionally understood in purely behavioral terms. In contrast, we argue that non-human mental psychopathology should be at least sometimes not only ascribed contentful mental representation but also understood as really having these states. To defend this view, we appeal to the interactivist account of mental representation, which is a kind of a constructive approach to meaning. We follow Mark Bickhard in assuming that only an organism ? either human or non-human ? capable of detecting its own misrepresentations is representational. However, under his autonomy-based account of biological function these minds are incapable of misrepresentations because these minds are, ex hypothesi, unable to detect error in such representations. To solve this problem, we argue that adding a historical dimension ? as in Millikan?s view on mental representations ? to Bickhard?s account of function makes mental misrepresentation of mentally-ill minds possible. Using Bickhard?s dynamic account of function, it is possible to explain why delusions and other mental disorders can be seen as locally functional. However, an etiological dimension can further explain why misrepresentations seem to be globally dysfunctional. Even if representational or biosemiotic hypotheses about non-human psychopathology are difficult to confirm empirically, we defend the view that they can enrich our understanding of the causes and development of such pathologies, and may constitute a new progressive research programme. Twit Text FOAVip Mental Misrepresentation in Non-human Psychopathology ????Biosemiotics http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=28943975 #FOAvip Twit Text # Free Paper on # # # # # LINK http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=28943975 #FOAvip English Wikipedia <ref>{{Cite pmid|28943975}}</ref> Mental Misrepresentation in Non-human Psychopathology #MMPMID28943975 Bielecka K; Marcinów M Biosemiotics 2017[]; 10 (2): 195-210 PMID28943975show ga In this paper, we defend a representational approach to at least some kinds of non-human psychopathology. Mentally-ill non-human minds, in particular in delusions, obsessive-compulsive disorders and similar cognitive states, are traditionally understood in purely behavioral terms. In contrast, we argue that non-human mental psychopathology should be at least sometimes not only ascribed contentful mental representation but also understood as really having these states. To defend this view, we appeal to the interactivist account of mental representation, which is a kind of a constructive approach to meaning. We follow Mark Bickhard in assuming that only an organism ? either human or non-human ? capable of detecting its own misrepresentations is representational. However, under his autonomy-based account of biological function these minds are incapable of misrepresentations because these minds are, ex hypothesi, unable to detect error in such representations. To solve this problem, we argue that adding a historical dimension ? as in Millikan?s view on mental representations ? to Bickhard?s account of function makes mental misrepresentation of mentally-ill minds possible. Using Bickhard?s dynamic account of function, it is possible to explain why delusions and other mental disorders can be seen as locally functional. However, an etiological dimension can further explain why misrepresentations seem to be globally dysfunctional. Even if representational or biosemiotic hypotheses about non-human psychopathology are difficult to confirm empirically, we defend the view that they can enrich our understanding of the causes and development of such pathologies, and may constitute a new progressive research programme. äMental Misrepresentation in Non-human Psychopathology (epmc).pdf DeepDyve Pubget Overpricing