Use my Search Websuite to scan PubMed, PMCentral, Journal Hosts and Journal Archives, FullText. Kick-your-searchterm to multiple Engines kick-your-query now !>

A dictionary by aggregated review articles of nephrology, medicine and the life sciences Your one-stop-run pathway from word to the immediate pdf of peer-reviewed on-topic knowledge.

10.1371/journal.pone.0133441 http://scihub22266oqcxt.onion/10.1371/journal.pone.0133441 C4512696!4512696!26204110     free     free     free Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 219.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 219.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 219.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 219.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534       PLoS+One 2015 ; 10 (7): ä Nephropedia Template TP {{tp|p=26204110|t=2015. Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery |pdf=|usr=}}{{26204110}} gab.com Text Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery JO: PLoS One http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=26204110 #FOAvip Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on corrupt officers. We examine the consequences of asymmetric and symmetric penalties by developing deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game-theoretic models of bribery. We find that the asymmetric penalty scheme can lead to a reduction in incidents of bribery. However, the extent of reduction depends on how the players update their strategies over time. If the interacting members change their strategies with a probability proportional to the payoff of the alternative strategy option, the reduction in incidents of bribery is less pronounced. Our results indicate that changing from a symmetric to an asymmetric penalty scheme may not suffice in achieving significant reductions in incidents of harassment bribery. Twit Text FOAVip Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery ????PLoS One http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=26204110 #FOAvip Twit Text # Free Paper on # # # # # LINK http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=26204110 #FOAvip English Wikipedia <ref>{{Cite pmid|26204110}}</ref> Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery #MMPMID26204110 Verma P; Sengupta S PLoS One 2015[]; 10 (7): ä PMID26204110show ga Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on corrupt officers. We examine the consequences of asymmetric and symmetric penalties by developing deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game-theoretic models of bribery. We find that the asymmetric penalty scheme can lead to a reduction in incidents of bribery. However, the extent of reduction depends on how the players update their strategies over time. If the interacting members change their strategies with a probability proportional to the payoff of the alternative strategy option, the reduction in incidents of bribery is less pronounced. Our results indicate that changing from a symmetric to an asymmetric penalty scheme may not suffice in achieving significant reductions in incidents of harassment bribery. äBribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribe(epmc).pdf DeepDyve Pubget Overpricing