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10.1038/srep10321 http://scihub22266oqcxt.onion/10.1038/srep10321 C4437292!4437292!25988875     free     free     free Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 217.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 217.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 217.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 217.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 217.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 217.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 217.6 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 251.2 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 251.2 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534 Deprecated: Implicit conversion from float 251.2 to int loses precision in C:\Inetpub\vhosts\kidney.de\httpdocs\pget.php on line 534       Sci+Rep 2015 ; 5 (ä): ä Nephropedia Template TP {{tp|p=25988875|t=2015. Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans |pdf=|usr=}}{{25988875}} gab.com Text Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans JO: Sci Rep http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=25988875 #FOAvip Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defectors often exceed the benefits for the group. It has been argued that centralized punishment institutions can overcome the detrimental effects of peer-punishment. However, this argument presupposes the existence of a legitimate authority and leaves an unresolved gap in the transition from peer-punishment to centralized punishment. Here we show that the origins of centralized punishment could lie in individuals? distinct ability to punish defectors. In our laboratory experiment, we vary the structure of the punishment situation to disentangle the effects of punitive preferences, monetary incentives, and individual punishment costs on the punishment of defectors. We find that actors tacitly coordinate on the strongest group member to punish defectors, even if the strongest individual incurs a net loss from punishment. Such coordination leads to a more effective and more efficient provision of a cooperative environment than we observe in groups of all equals. Our results show that even an arbitrary assignment of an individual to a focal position in the social hierarchy can trigger the endogenous emergence of more centralized forms of punishment. Twit Text FOAVip Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans ????Sci Rep http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=25988875 #FOAvip Twit Text # Free Paper on # # # # # LINK http://www.kidney.de/pget.php?&tw=1&pmid=25988875 #FOAvip English Wikipedia <ref>{{Cite pmid|25988875}}</ref> Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans #MMPMID25988875 Diekmann A; Przepiorka W Sci Rep 2015[]; 5 (ä): ä PMID25988875show ga Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defectors often exceed the benefits for the group. It has been argued that centralized punishment institutions can overcome the detrimental effects of peer-punishment. However, this argument presupposes the existence of a legitimate authority and leaves an unresolved gap in the transition from peer-punishment to centralized punishment. Here we show that the origins of centralized punishment could lie in individuals? distinct ability to punish defectors. In our laboratory experiment, we vary the structure of the punishment situation to disentangle the effects of punitive preferences, monetary incentives, and individual punishment costs on the punishment of defectors. We find that actors tacitly coordinate on the strongest group member to punish defectors, even if the strongest individual incurs a net loss from punishment. Such coordination leads to a more effective and more efficient provision of a cooperative environment than we observe in groups of all equals. Our results show that even an arbitrary assignment of an individual to a focal position in the social hierarchy can trigger the endogenous emergence of more centralized forms of punishment. äPunitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in th(epmc).pdf DeepDyve Pubget Overpricing