Reasoning and choice in the Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD): implications for improving
Bayesian reasoning
#MMPMID25873906
Tubau E
; Aguilar-Lleyda D
; Johnson ED
Front Psychol
2015[]; 6
(?): 353
PMID25873906
show ga
The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a two-step decision problem involving
counterintuitive conditional probabilities. The first choice is made among three
equally probable options, whereas the second choice takes place after the
elimination of one of the non-selected options which does not hide the prize.
Differing from most Bayesian problems, statistical information in the MHD has to
be inferred, either by learning outcome probabilities or by reasoning from the
presented sequence of events. This often leads to suboptimal decisions and
erroneous probability judgments. Specifically, decision makers commonly develop a
wrong intuition that final probabilities are equally distributed, together with a
preference for their first choice. Several studies have shown that repeated
practice enhances sensitivity to the different reward probabilities, but does not
facilitate correct Bayesian reasoning. However, modest improvements in
probability judgments have been observed after guided explanations. To explain
these dissociations, the present review focuses on two types of causes producing
the observed biases: Emotional-based choice biases and cognitive limitations in
understanding probabilistic information. Among the latter, we identify a crucial
cause for the universal difficulty in overcoming the equiprobability illusion:
Incomplete representation of prior and conditional probabilities. We conclude
that repeated practice and/or high incentives can be effective for overcoming
choice biases, but promoting an adequate partitioning of possibilities seems to
be necessary for overcoming cognitive illusions and improving Bayesian reasoning.
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