Dissecting contact tracing apps in the Android platform #MMPMID33989350
Kouliaridis V; Kambourakis G; Chatzoglou E; Geneiatakis D; Wang H
PLoS One 2021[]; 16 (5): e0251867 PMID33989350show ga
Contact tracing has historically been used to retard the spread of infectious diseases, but if it is exercised by hand in large-scale, it is known to be a resource-intensive and quite deficient process. Nowadays, digital contact tracing has promptly emerged as an indispensable asset in the global fight against the coronavirus pandemic. The work at hand offers a meticulous study of all the official Android contact tracing apps deployed hitherto by European countries. Each app is closely scrutinized both statically and dynamically by means of dynamic instrumentation. Depending on the level of examination, static analysis results are grouped in two axes. The first encompasses permissions, API calls, and possible connections to external URLs, while the second concentrates on potential security weaknesses and vulnerabilities, including the use of trackers, in-depth manifest analysis, shared software analysis, and taint analysis. Dynamic analysis on the other hand collects data pertaining to Java classes and network traffic. The results demonstrate that while overall these apps are well-engineered, they are not free of weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and misconfigurations that may ultimately put the user security and privacy at risk.
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PLoS+One 2021 ; 16 (5): e0251867
