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2018 ; 8
(1
): 6686
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The signalling game between plants and pollinators
#MMPMID29703897
Sun S
; Leshowitz MI
; Rychtá? J
Sci Rep
2018[Apr]; 8
(1
): 6686
PMID29703897
show ga
Plants can send floral signals to advertise their reward for pollinators. Based
on the presence or absents of such signals, pollinators can determine whether to
visit plants. Plants can send dishonest signals but foraging behaviours of
pollinators can limit the cheating strategies of plants. We model the
plant-pollinator interactions by the two-type Spence signalling game and
investigate the conditions under which honest signalling can be established. In
our model, plants either send costly signal or they do not. The cost of signal is
dependent on the quality of plant. Pollinators can learn from the interactions
with plants and can update their willingness to visit plants' flowers to maximize
their foraging efficiency. We find three general conditions that are required for
the evolutionary stability of honest signaling. Those conditions are satisfied if
there is (a) a high frequency of high-yield signalling plants in the population,
(b) the balance between cost and benefit of signalling, and (c) high cost of
dishonest signalling. Our model also predicts that other factors contributing to
the establishment of honest signaling are the low abundance of pollinators, and
the positive density-dependent and positive frequency-dependent relationship
between plants and pollinators.
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